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The present case is in accord with prior Louisiana jurisprudence in laying down the rule that damages is the remedy
for the breach of a contract to do or not to do, with specific performance being allowed only in unusual circumstances. 19
J.B.D.

TORTS-LIABILITY OF ESCAPED CONVICT FOR EXPENSES OF RE-

CAPTURE--Defendant, an escaped convict, was recaptured and
returned to the penitentiary at cost to the state in excess of one
thousand dollars. The state thereupon sued the defendant in tort
to recover the amount thus expended. Held, recovery denied.
State Highway and Public Works Commission v. Cobb, 215 N.C.
556, 2 S.E. (2d) 565 (1939).
Apparently this is a case of novel impression; at least the
court so considered it. The basic problem involves the inherent
difference between a tort and a crime. Modern opinion agrees that
a wrongful act may be both criminal and tortious, and may subject the wrongdoer to punishment by the state and to civil suit
by the individual immediately harmed.'
19. Art. 1142, French Civil Code, provides: "Every obligation to do or
not to do resolves itself into damages, in case of non-performance on the
part of the debtor." (Translation supplied.) Nevertheless, it may be proper
to say with the majority of the French commentators that, as a consequence
of the wide discretion assumed by the courts in specifically enforcing obligations to do or not to do with the aid of the method of astreintes [7 Planiol
et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais (1931) 84, n' 787], specific
performance is the rule rather than the exception even as to such obligations.
However, a judicial reluctance to compel the performance of a personal act
-fait
personnel--is still general. 1 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde, Trait6
Th~orique et Pratique de Droit Civil, Des Obligations (3 ed. 1906) 469, n* 431;
24 Demolombe, Trait6 Des Contracts ou Des Obligations Conventionnelles en
G~n~ral (1877) 486, n* 488; 7 Huc, Commentaire Th~orique et Pratique du
Code Civil (1894) 192, no 135; 4 Marcad6, Explication Th6orique et Pratique
du Code Civil (7 ed. 1873) 437-439, nos 511-513; 2 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6
E16mentaire de Droit Civil (11 ed. 1937) 66-69, nos 173-175. See also Art. 1144,
French Civil Code (on substituted performance).
197-199. "Ainsi l'exdcution directe de Z'obligation est la r~gle pour toute espdce
d'obligations. La r~gle ne regoit d'exception que s'il y a impossibilitd de
poursuivre l'ex~cution directe." (At 258, no 198).
Translation: "Thus specific performance of the obligation is the rule, for
every kind of obligation. The rule is subject to exceptions only if it is impossible to decree specific performance."
1. Miller, Handbook of Criminal Law (1934) 21, § 4(b); Clark, Handbook
of Criminal Law (3 ed. 1915) 8, § 2; Clark and Marshall, A Treatise on the
Law of Crimes (3 ed. 1927) 4-5, § 2.
It is generally held in America that criminal and civil proceedings are
not mutually exclusive. State v. Loyacano, 135 La. 945, 66 So. 307 (1914);
State v. Vogt, 141 La. 764, 15 So. 674 (1917); State v. Walsen, 17 Colo. 170, 28
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NOTES

Although heretofore the courts have been silent as to the
fugitive's liability for the expenses of his recapture, it is a settled
rule that the defendant may be compelled to pay the costs of his
prosecution. 2 In Michigan, by statutory provision, the prisoner of
means is forced to reimburse the state for the per capita cost of
maintenance, and the state may even secure a lien on his property for the amount of his future room and boardA
Liability was denied in the principal case on the theory that
the escape was an offense against the state's sovereignty rather
than an invasion of its proprietary rights, since the expenditure
was voluntarily made by the state for the protection of its citizens. The court seemed reluctant to admit that the state could
institute both civil and criminal proceedings in this type of case.
However, it is clear that if the original crime is an invasion of
the state's proprietary interest, such as the larceny or embezzlePac. 1119, 15 L.R.A. 456 (1892); State v. Schoonover, 135 Ind. 526, 35 N.E. 119,
21 L.R.A. 767 (1893); Newell v. Cowan, 30 Miss. 492 (1855); Knox County v.
Hunolt, 110 Mo. 67, 19 S.W. 628 (1892); Austin v. Carswell, 67 Hun. 579, 22
N.Y. Supp. 478 (1893), Even if prosecution is not commenced, private suit
may be instituted. Williams v. Dickinson, 28 Fla. 90, 9 So. 847 (1891); Powell
v. Augusta & S. R. Co., 77 Ga. 192, 3 S.E. 757 (1887); Parker v. Lanier, 82 Ga.
216, 8 S.E. 57 (1888).
In England, according to the earlier decisions, a different rule prevailed,
the tort being said to have merged in the felony. See Stone v. Marsh, 6 B. &
C. 551, 564, 108 Eng. Rep. 554, 559 (1827); White v. Spittigue, 13 M. & W. 603,
608, 153 Eng. Rep. 252, 254 (1845).
But in Smith v. Selwyn [1914] 3 K.B. 98, the English doctrine was definitely settled that there was only a suspension of the civil action until the
defendant was prosecuted by the sovereign in a criminal suit. In a few cases
in America, the doctrine of suspension of the civil remedy until criminal
prosecution has been followed. Martin's Ex'r v. Martin, 25 Ala. 201 (1854);
Boody v. Keeting, 4 Greenl. 164 (Me. 1826).
2. Parker v. Robertson, 14 La. Ann. 249 (1859); State v. Hyland, 36 La.
Ann. 709 (1884); State v. Chapman, 38 La. Ann. 348 (1886); Parish Board of
Directors v. Hebert, 112 La. 467, 36 So. 497 (1904); State v. Belle, 92 Iowa 163,
60 N.W. 505 (1894); Doyle v. O'Dowd, 85 N.H. 402, 159 Atl. 301 (1932). In
Commonwealth v. McCue's Ex'rs, 109 Va. 302, 63 S.E. 1066, 1067 (1909), the
court stated that the character of the payment of costs is defined to be an
exaction "simply for the purpose of reimbursing to the public treasury the
precise amount which the conduct of the defendant has rendered it necessary
should be expended for the vindication of the public justice of the state and
its violated laws. It is money paid, laid out, and expended for the purpose of
repairing the consequences of the defendant's wrong. It is demanded of him
for a good and sufficient consideration, and constitutes an item of debt from
The right to enforce payment of them is a
him to the commonwealth ....
mere incident to the conviction, and thereby vested in the commonwealth for
the sole purpose of replacing in the treasury the amount which the defendant
himself has caused to be withdrawn from it." However, the right of a court
to impose costs depends entirely on statutory regulations. People v. Wallace,
245 Mich. 310, 222 N.W. 698 (1929); State v. Boog, 9 N.J. Misc. 261, 153 AtI. 374
(1931); Commonwealth v. Buccieri, 153 Pa. 570, 26 AtI. 245 (1893); Commonwealth v. Trunk, 320 Pa. 270, 182 AtI. 540 (1936).
3. Mich. Pub. Acts (1935) No. 253. It is interesting to note that in charging a prisoner for his upkeep, regard is had for claims of persons having a
moral or legal right to maintenance out of the estate of the prisoner.
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ment of state funds, the sovereignty may prosecute criminally
and sue for redress. 4 It is difficult to understand why the state
should be barred from civil remedy because the offense is a
secondary one and the expenditure of state funds was made for
the protection of the public. The fact that there are sufficient
sanctions in the criminal law does not reimburse the state
treasury; what the state in this instance sought to achieve was
reparation and indemnity rather than to punish for crime. It is
submitted that the courts should hesitate to adopt the sporting
attitude that if a prisoner is unfortunate in his attempt to escape
from prison and does not effectively evade his captors, the law
should stand the expense of the chase.
J.G.C.
4. In re Leszynsky, 15 Fed. Cas.. No., 8,279 (1899) (involving a statutory
crime in which the United States government, although it had recovered a
sum in a civil suit, was allowed to prosecute the defendant in a criminal action); State v. Walsen, 17 Colo. 170, 28 Pac. 1119, 15 L.R.A. 456 (1892); Knox
County v. Hunolt, 110 Mo. 67, 19 S.W. 628 (1892). Cf. State v. Stein, 1 Rich. L.
189 (S.C. 1845), in which the court allowed the criminal action after recovery
by the state in a civil suit, but held that the sovereignty would have to elect
the remedy preferred due to the provisions of the particular statute which
made the wrongful act criminal.

